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respect to the homeless. There is a right to housing, and the plight of the homeless is
becoming one of the great disgraces in the United States today.
We often forget that the basic question on human rights is how we can help people
most effectively whose human rights have been violated or are under threat. That will
always be the big question. It leads to a question of priorities. One priority is that we
try to learn from civil liberties and civil rights fights in this and other countries. There
is as yet a dearth of pertinent discussion ofthat history. We still think it is great to go
to the Supreme Court. Yet, have we ended segregation in schools? Indeed not. Have
we significantly affected it? Maybe. It was not enough to get Brown v. Board ofEdu-
cation. We had to seek legislation, and we must get busy with legislatures again.
In this country the story of international human rights progress has been mostly a
congressional history. It began with the statutes of 1974-76. There would not have
been any Carter human rights policy without those statutes. A few Congressmen were
almost geniuses in the field, notably Don Fraser.
I will not spend additional time on torts, because so much remains to be done with
regard to use in courts of international law on more significant matters, such as those
concerning conventional and nuclear warfare. We ought to raise that question in
courts again even though it was not done very successfully during the Vietnam years.
There still is a role for the adversary system. If you want a model, a young colleague
and I have filed a brief in the Greenham Commons case raising this point: regarding
crimes against humanity that are threatened, are judges accomplices? (1 wish that
could have been the title of today's discussion. If you want the answer, you must read
quite a bit about crimes against humanity.) It was not discussed much during Viet-
nam. For example, it was not discussed in Telford Taylor's book.
I hope that fairly soon we can have a rerun ofJudgment at Nuremberg. We might
get it established that crimes against humanity are wrong, and that judges ought to say
so. If they do not, we may have movies called Judgment in Washington.
REMARKS BY W. MICHAEL REISMAN*
Rather than criticizing the diverse judgments in Tel-Oren, I will concentrate on the
lessons that may be learned from the case so that implementation of human rights can
be enhanced. It has been difficult to establish human rights norms and even more
difficult to create institutions for implementing them, for, to put it bluntly, effective
institutions would not serve the interests of all of those currently managing the affairs
of states. In some states, there is a strong popular demand for human rights, and it is
reflected to a large degree in the behavior of government. In other states there is no
such popular demand. In a distressingly large number of states, official power is main-
tained by the systematic abuse of what we refer to as human rights. A significant
segment of the effective elites of the planet are not only not committed to human
rights; they are positively threatened by them. Unfortunately, in the intricacies of
contemporary international politics, relatively good governments believe they must
sometimes rely upon and curry favor with unsavory ones. The international political
costs of denouncing human rights violations become prohibitive, and they are criti-
cized "discreetly" and "diplomatically" or ignored.
Those committed to extending and implementing fundamental human rights pro-
claimed in key international documents thus face two related problems. While the
norms are universal in aspiration and, in a verbal sense, in reach, they are far from
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universal in support they can expect from national elites. Related to this melancholy
fact is the reluctance or resistance of many of these same elites to establish effective
institutions for implementing and policing international human rights. Witness the
pattern ofstates whose leaders will sign any human rights document as long as there is
no implementation system.
Despite these obstacles, a conjunction of circumstances has led to the proclamation
of a rather comprehensive code of international human rights. Great effort has gone
into creation of specialized human rights agencies. But precisely because of elite am-
bivalence or resistance, most of these institutions have been marked by ineffectiveness.
The special challenge to the international human rights lawyer has been to find an
existing set of institutions to which private individuals, not affiliated with the state
apparatus, may have access, which may be enlisted to implement recognized interna-
tional norms.
In the United States, human rights lawyers have sought to enlist domestic courts as
functional international human rights enforcers for many reasons. These courts are in
continuous operation and they are effective, in the sense that they are coordinated
with the political branches of their governments. If they render a judgment, it can be
effectuated with regard to any property or persons within their jurisdiction. In coun-
tries such as ours in which national courts have been major agents for protection and
extension of civil liberties, courts appear to recommend themselves with even greater
force for a coordinate international role.
But the assignment of multiple roles to a single institution may create certain types
of conflicts of interest, for institutions are by definition specialized, and there is a limit
to their elasticity. The custodians of an institution may be expected to lend and bend
their institutions to desirable ancillary functions which were not originally intended
but, above all, they will be concerned with the limits of elasticity, that point at which
the ancillary function begins to undermine the continued efficacious discharge of their
primary or manifest function and its contribution to the good working of government.
We encounter here the limits of the functional elasticity of institutions. It is not
unique to courts. Consider the venerable example of the immunity of diplomatic mis-
sions. Article 22(1) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides:
"The premises of the Mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State
may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission." This inter-
national policy is, as the International Court said in the Hostages case, of "fundamen-
tal character." The reason for diplomatic inviolability is hardly recondite. Embassies
are deemed indispensable to interelite communication. International law from earliest
times has sought to protect that function. But inviolability also makes diplomatic
premises attractive for purposes of asylum. When there are human rights violations,
there will be a strong human impulse to use the premises accorded inviolability to
spirit out human beings who would otherwise face severe and unlawful deprivations.
But there are costs. That ancillary function will hardly endear the embassy in ques-
tion to the host state. The net result of stretching the embassy to the ancillary func-
tion of asylum may be to undermine the effectiveness of diplomacy, which is the major
purpose for the inviolability principle. In the short term, vigorous use of diplomatic
asylum will sour relations between host state and embassy. In the longer term, it may
erode the tolerance for inviolability itself and thus impede interelite communication.
States appear willing to use embassies for asylum purposes when the embassies in
question are not performing diplomatic functions indispensable to the two states con-
cerned, for then the reduced effectiveness of the embassy has little political cost. But
as between states whose diplomatic and political connections require open and unob-
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structed diplomatic communications, there is a strong impulse not to use embassies
for purposes of asylum. Hence, many of the officials who may be committed to
human rights will seek to protect the major function of embassies and struggle to
prevent them from being turned into underground railways.
The same considerations apply to national courts with regard to international
human rights matters. Judicial elasticity here appears to reach its boundary when the
prosecution of a privately initiated suit draws the court into the path of the executive's
conduct of foreign affairs, a collision which is definitional when the defendant is a
foreign government or its agent, and the subject of the claim is its behavior in alleged
violation of international law. A court's willingness to precipitate this collision is all
the less likely when there is no explicit and politically meaningful indication of sup-
port from Congress. Even in a state in which there is wide popular support for inter-
national human rights, recognition of the executive's need for a freer hand in the
conduct of effective diplomacy may press courts not to exercise their potential juris-
diction in human rights cases, because it would conflict with the discharge of one of
the manifest functions of another branch of the same government. Hence, it should be
no surprise that the same courts that may be quite vigorous in the pursuit of domestic
civil rights will proceed more cautiously, if at all, internationally and, when pressed
beyond what they believe they can responsibly supply, will react negatively and some-
times even viciously. In this regard, I would take exception to Professor Paust's ety-
mological inquiry into U.S. judicial usage of the term "human rights." Though the
normative content of the terms "human" and "civil" rights may be the same, there is
an important contextual difference. The pursuit of civil rights involves U.S. courts'
adjudicating between U.S. nationals and their federal and state governments; the situ-
ation changes in important ways when the defendant is a foreign government and the
plaintiff is its national.
We might call this the Le Louis phenomenon, after the fascinating judgment of Sir
William Scott, or Lord Stowell, as he later was. In that case a French slaver was
picked up in international waters by a British flag vessel and brought in as prize. The
Admiralty Court in London vacated the condemnation, even though England had by
that time condemned slavery. Lord Stowell superordinated what he believed were the
common interests in maintaining a certain type of public order of the oceans, in which
no jurisdiction, other than that based upon treaty, could be exercised by flag vessels of
one state over those of another. He believed that if British ships ignored the flag
principle in favor of a higher principle, one of the basic struts of the public order of the
oceans would be weakened.
It would be simplistic to say that Lord Stowell was in favor of slavery, as it would
be outrageous to say that Learned Hand in Bernstein cultivated a secret passion to
protect the Reich. In cases of this sort, judges will protect what they feel to be their
primary institutional responsibility and will defer the human rights claim. I believe
that, for reasons such as these, cases like Filartiga are unusual and unless other
changes are made will prove to be only "temporary footholds," as Judge Wilkey said
in another context. Tel-Oren is striking in that in the court of appeals, three judges,
for different but equally jumbled international legal reasons, concluded that the case
should not be pursued in their court. The government indicated the same preference
for result in the brief of the Solicitor General; implicitly, the Supreme Court endorsed
that result.
Like all of you, I am grieved by the drastically reduced role for the judiciary in
human rights cases that emerges from Tel-Oren and some other recent decisions. In
distinction from Professor Newman, I believe that national courts may yet be used as
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fora for enforcement of international human rights. Ifwe cannot harness those courts,
the prospects of private initiation and effective enforcement of human rights are bleak.
But securing a long-term extension of national jurisdiction in matters such as these
will require more than simply persuading the judiciary on a case-by-case basis. Terms
such as "separation of powers," "act of state," "political question," etc., are all indica-
tive of decent judges' concern for discharging primary responsibilities to the state or-
ganization in which they are part. That concern must be addressed systematically.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 demonstrates that this can be done.
From the time of the Schooner Exchange, U.S. courts have held that public acts of
foreign governments, even when they violate domestic and/or international law rights
of U.S. nationals, are inappropriate for adjudication in U.S. courts because, in one
formula or another, the private initiation of such suits could impede the executive
branch's constitutional mandate to conduct foreign relations with those same foreign
states. The net result of this policy was to deny many U.S. citizens their days in court
in cases in which U.S. jurisdiction was otherwise well founded.
After almost half a century of individual, uncoordinated efforts to persuade courts
to change the sovereign immunity approach had failed, a different tack was taken.
U.S. merchants and traders formed an efficient coalition. Sufficient pressure could
then be mounted and brought to bear on the executive branch and Congress to strike a
historic compromise. For a limited catalogue of actions, the executive agreed that
claims of sovereign immunity would henceforth be referred to courts without the
political detour and often termination at the Department of State.
Congress endorsed the arrangement, foreign governments were put on notice
through a relatively clear statutory instrument, and the courts could then act respon-
sibly in cases in which the political element was manifest and potentially important
with the assurance that it was now national policy for such jurisdiction to be exer-
cised. With the agreement of the political branches, the functions of the courts in this
sensitive area were redefined more broadly. This is not to say that the act has resolved
all the problems in claims of this sort. Given the political and economic dimensions of
international business, the problems are in some ways insoluble. But the act has re-
sulted in an enhanced judicial jurisdiction for privately initiated claims.
A comparable strategy must be undertaken by those committed to international
protection of human rights. Rather than uncoordinated and individual assaults on
courts about the country, a coordinated lobby should be formed with a national con-
stituency. It should bring pressure to bear on the executive branch and Congress to
secure a statutory regime establishing or clarifying judicial jurisdiction for certain
human rights torts. To continue to insist that this has already been done by section
1350 is to engage in a sterile, scholarly controversy whose outcome, it is now plain,
will not influence court behavior. There are times when courts should lead other
branches; a case like Brown may be our judiciary's finest hour. But it is clear that our
courts are loathe to lead in international human rights. Hence a different strategy is
indicated.
The selection of the particular human rights most appropriate for enforcement in
national courts and, in particular in U.S. courts, should be made with great care. It is
unlikely and unrealistic to expect that every component of the emergent international
human rights code can be enforced in U.S. courts. Much more will be gained in the
next two decades if a few types of violations come to be deemed nationally justiciable.
We cannot assume that alleged "core" violations or the most heinous violations are
necessarily appropriate for national adjudication. In choosing targets for judicial im-
plementation in the United States, it would be prudent to test the utility of the judicial
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strategy by at least three factors: (1) the actual degree to which effective elites about
the globe concur in characterizing the behavior in question as socially pernicious;
(2) the extent to which those in the United States charged with executive responsibili-
ties can and are willing to accept the political costs ofjudicial implementation of mat-
ters which cut against external political relationships; (3) the extent to which such
suits would seriously harm the economy, foreign policy and orderly judicial adminis-
tration in the United States. For it may well be that costs will be so heavy that human
rights judicial jurisdiction may have to be very carefully circumscribed. All these
questions are matters which should begin not in confrontation but in dialogue with the
Executive and Congress where a thorough and responsible policy analysis may be
undertaken. If the current administration is not sympathetic to the program, it may
be commenced with Congress.
Unfortunately, the structure of the international human rights bar in the United
States does not lend itself to this strategy. It is a largely voluntary bar, contributing its
own time and energy to most cases that are prosecuted. It is dispersed about the
country and tends to operate in episodic fashion, when a case appears which a well-
meaning attorney believes can contribute to some human rights objective. Interna-
tional human rights lawyers in the country are a potentially large group, but they do
not command the resources of major corporations and, hence, are unable to form
something comparable to a "Rule of Law Committee." Yet if the problem is appro-
priately understood, these obstacles can be surmounted. A national, coordinated ef-
fort can bring about an historic change.
If this coordinated approach is not undertaken, the episodic judicial strategy cur-
rently pursued will fail and, indeed, will ultimately become counterproductive, as
human rights activists become more resentful of judicial resistance and judges more
resentful of what they believe are unreasonable and impossible claims being made
upon their own jurisdictions. That would be tragic, for U.S. judges are our natural
allies and not our enemies.
Tel-Oren does have lessons for us. They are not, I believe, the lessons that Judges
Bork and Robb declaim, for almost a decade of adjudication in sovereign immunity
matters demonstrates that U.S. courts can playa role in matters that have a potential
for international political disruption and for complicating the executive's conduct of
foreign affairs. The key lesson of Tel-Oren is rather that an attempt to establish an
effective human rights jurisdiction must incorporate all three branches, on the order of
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and must choose the particular norms appro-
priate fot judicial implementation with great care.
COMMENTS BY CORNELIUS FLINTERMAN*
Tel-Oren raises the intriguing but difficult question of the proper role of domestic
courts in adjudicating claims relating to international human rights violations which
have occurred fully outside the territory of that state. In a week's time many Euro-
pean countries will have celebrated the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II.
That war was fought to restore human rights, governmental freedom and democracy
in continental Europe. The name, among others, of President Franklin Roosevelt,
who was at the same time a champion of economic rights within the United States,
will be forever linked with this cause. The name of Roosevelt, this time Eleanor
Roosevelt, is also connected with that great legal document-the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, adopted in 1948.
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